INTRODUCTION
Tax treaties generally require that the signatories eliminate "double taxation," through the extension by each country to its own residents of either foreign tax credits or exemption for foreign source income (FSI) that the other country taxes on a source basis. The treaties also commonly seek to address "fiscal evasion." While this term only denotes illegal tax avoidance, some commentators discern a broader policy goal, embodied in the international tax regime that includes the treaty network, of avoiding "double non-taxation," 1 or the creation of "stateless income" 2 that is taxed nowhere.
Put the two concerns together and you arguably have a "single tax principle," 3 holding that each increment of a multinational taxpayer's global income should be subject to tax somewhere exactly once, rather than either zero times or twice. For convenience, I will refer to double taxation as departing from the single tax principle on the upside, and to double nontaxation as departing from it on the downside. helps to show that a multilateral, not just bilateral (as with treaties) process, is imperative insofar as countries decide that they want to address stateless income.
II. UPSIDE DEPARTURES FROM THE SINGLE TAX PRINCIPLE
Suppose the United States was choosing between (a) taxing all of its resident multinationals' FSI at the same 35 percent rate that it imposes on domestic source corporate income, without deferral but with foreign tax credits, and (b) treating foreign taxes as merely deductible, but substantially lowering the tax rate for FSI. Under option (b), unlike option (a), U.S. companies with FSI would formally be subject to "double taxation." Yet option (b) would result in imposing lower U.S. taxes on FSI than option (a), in any instance where, given the 6 One could perhaps reformulate the single tax principle as requiring that income be taxed at either the residence country rate or the source country rate, without regard to how many times it is taxed. Indeed, this might help explain why levying both residence country and source country taxes on the same income is deemed permissible under the single tax principle if the former offer foreign tax credits. (The alternative explanation of its consistency with the single tax principle would be that the credits effectively negate the source country tax, so far as the taxpayer is concerned.) If the single tax principle were thus reformulated, however, it would effectively amount to arguing for following either capital export neutrality (which calls for applying the residence country rate) or capital import neutrality (which calls for applying the source country rate. Even leaving aside the oddity of one's apparently not caring which of these two rival principles is followed, I have discussed elsewhere why I view both of these principles, along with other "single-bullet" global welfare norms such as capital ownership neutrality, as normatively unpersuasive and unhelpful. There also is a strong purposive argument in favor of allowing such bifurcation. Suppose we think of the bar on double taxation as meant to address the concern that countries are inclined to over-burden cross-border activity. The required response is to require mitigation of residence- and-match approach, given that one cannot actually reduce the overall mitigation that is provided.
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The point can be made more generally as follows. Under an Option Z-style approach, the MRR equals the ratio between (a) the tax rate on FSI and (b) the tax rate on domestic source income. More generally, so long as the MRR equals or exceeds the above ratio between the tax rates on FSI and domestic source income, one does not violate the single tax principle by combining an MRR that is below 100 percent MRR with a tax rate on FSI that is greater than zero.
There admittedly is room here for interpretive ambiguity. For example, if not all FSI and/or not all domestic source income are taxed the same, or if there are systematic tax base differences between the domestic tax treatment of the two types of income, then testing for compliance with the above rule may potentially involve controversy. However, in a simple and straightforward case that lacks these issues, the comparison can simply be based on applicable marginal tax rates.
Is this a radical new approach to interpreting the single tax principle? The answer clearly is no. In particular, consider Code section 965, enacted in 2004 to provide a temporary repatriation tax holiday. This provision combined (a) making qualifying foreign dividends in effect 85 percent excludable with (b) reducing allowable foreign tax credits by the same ratio. Allowing interpretive nuance with respect to the bar on double taxation might nonetheless be subject to criticism if, as a general political matter, there was a significant risk of opening the door to the imposition by treaty signatories of excessive tax burdens on cross-border economic activity. However, one could easily exaggerate countries' unilateral predilection to target such activity for heavy tax burdens. As suggested by the recent movement towards exemption in countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan (also widely supported in the United States), pressures of tax competition, plus eagerness to help home-country corporate "champions" compete with their overseas business rivals, frequently outweigh the urge to maximize domestic tax revenues, and thus reduce the need to keep formal legal barriers stronger rather than weaker.
III. DOWNSIDE DEPARTURES FROM THE SINGLE TAX PRINCIPLE
Why object to stateless income, or that which is taxed zero times rather than once? The question is harder and more complicated than it may initially seem. From the unilateral national welfare standpoint of a given country, foreign taxes are just a cost. Thus, suppose a U.S.
company, owned by U.S. individuals, can pay taxes of either €10 million or zero on its operations in the European Union, without any effect either on its level of U.S. investment or on its U.S. tax liability, depending solely on whether the U.S. rules discourage it from doing E.U.
tax planning. This might turn, for example, on whether the company can use the U.S. check-thebox rules to shift taxable income from high-tax EU countries into tax havens, without thereby incurring U.S. tax liability under subpart F.
In this scenario, there is little or no reason for the U.S. unilaterally to object to the company's creation of stateless income. Nonetheless, both the U.S. under subpart F, and various exemption countries under their own controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules, often tax resident companies' FSI where it either has been reported as arising in a tax haven, or is of a kind that seems likely to end up in a haven. 23 Similar concerns appear to underlie the OECD BEPS project.
I have elsewhere argued that this reflects countries' often having "good reason for disfavoring high levels of actual or suspected foreign tax minimization. Income that is reported as arising in a tax haven may be unlikely to have been earned there economically, given that havens often have limited productive capacity. In addition, as a matter of successful tax planning, shifting reported income so that it arises outside of the domestic tax base, even if it initially shows up in a foreign jurisdiction, with a significant tax rate, in which one has boots (so to speak) on the ground, often is merely a first step towards further on-shifting it to a tax haven.
Thus, it is reasonable for countries to use the fact that income has been reported as arising in a tax haven -or is of a kind that seems likely to end up in a tax haven -as a 'tag' indicating an increased likelihood that it was actually earned at home."
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To be sure, countries' aversion to overseas tax avoidance is not continuous and ongoing.
In the United States, for example, years of government toleration of U.S. companies' use of check-the-box to avoid subpart F's checks on avoidance of other countries' taxes arguably reflects the view that we benefit, rather than lose, from such activity. 25 Considerable variation in countries' tolerance of, or hostility to overseas tax avoidance should come as no surprise, given the underlying ambiguity (and likely heterogeneity) of the domestic national welfare effects.
Accordingly, with respect to downside departures from the single tax principle, while outcomes that matter substantively, not just formally, are indeed at stake, the principle fails to 23 See Shaviro, The Crossroads Versus the Seesaw, supra, [20] [21] Id. at 20. 25 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, "BEPS conference at Bocconi University in Milan" (May 21, 2014 , available online at http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2014/05/beps-conference-at-bocconi-university.html ), noting that this is how many European tax policy commentators view the U.S. check-the-box rules.
